This paper analyzes the historical relationship between the political coloration of the government and stock market performance in France between 1871 and 2008. The Left-wing/Right-wing dichotomy, which is ubiquitous in French political discourse, is utilized in order to build a comparative analytical framework. During the 150 months characterized by the appointment of a new government regardless the coloration, we find that the monthly stock return is, on average, three times higher than for other months. The market appreciates in value with all new governments. However, in the long run, the real return of French stocks averages 4.40% per year under Left-wing versus 0.11% under Right-wing governments. This difference, although statistically robust, is not the result of added compensation for higher risk investments, nor is it driven by short special periods. The existence of a more favorable macroeconomic context during the rule of Left-wing governments only explains one third of this difference. A large part of the difference is concentrated during the three months prior to a coloration change. Assuming that the market anticipates coloration changes three months in advance, we move the boundaries: the difference in stock returns becomes insignificant.
Introduction
In May 1981, when Socialist President, François Mitterrand, was elected, the French stock market suffered its worst monthly fall in history (-33%) . But during his first mandate, stock prices increased by 250%, and rose to 450% by the time he left office at the end of his second mandate in May 1995. However, it is a commonly held belief that Right governments are more business oriented whereas the Left favors wealth redistribution often at the expense of firms. Assuming that governments manage according to this philosophical demarcation, this distinction should then impact the stock market. Therefore, we expect that stock returns should be higher under the power of the Right governments and lower under the Left.
Using a long-term, robust monthly series of French stock market data, we measure the performances under Left and Right governments beginning with the birth of the Third Republic in 1871. Dividend yields are quite similar between both types of governments, but stock prices increase by 5.90% a year under the Left governments versus only 2.12% under the Right. The inflation rate is slightly higher under the Right (5.61% versus 5.46%). As a result, the real total annualized return of French stocks is on average 4.40% under the Left governments and only 0.11% under the Right. 2 The excess return (total return minus short term rate) shows the same difference. Hence, these empirical results appear to contradict the conventional wisdom.
Several robustness checks are applied, showing that this difference is statistically significant and is not the result of simple chance, as indicated by a bootstrap test. Nor is this difference driven by few exceptional periods, such as would be demonstrated by the result of two alternative political investment strategies: to buy stocks under governments of the Left and invest the money at the short-term rate under Right, versus buying stocks under governments of the Right and short-term rate under Left. Additionally, this difference is not compensation for higher risk investments under Left governments.
On the other hand, a more favorable macroeconomic context under the Left, can partially explain the difference. To control for this effect, monthly stock returns are decomposed into expected and unexpected parts according to several macroeconomic variables known to predict stock returns. The fitted values from the regression of stock returns on these macroeconomic variables represent the expected portion of the return, whereas the regression residuals represent the unexpected returns. We then analyze differences in each component under Left and Right governments. This unexpected part is negative (-1.48% annualized) under Right and positive (1.56% annualized) under Left. Thus, the difference remains strong after having control for the macro-economic context.
More crucially, a large part of the difference is concentrated during the three months prior to a political coloration change. Accepting the hypothesis that the market is able to anticipate coloration changes three months before they occur, we move the boundary separating Left-wing and Right-wing governments to three months before the actual change of government is instated. As a result, the higher returns observed under the Left diminish greatly. The difference between the two returns becomes small enough so that this hypothesis of correct anticipation may turn out to be the key effect.
Furthermore, in the short-term, the political factor causes price returns as are expected according to the theory of uncertain information (Brown et al. 1988 ):
the stock market positively reacts to the appointment of all new governments (regardless his coloration), since a new government ends one uncertainty. The average monthly stock returns for the 150 months during which the government changes are three times higher than other months. 3 But, there is no difference in monthly returns between the appointment of Left and Right governments, or when the coloration of the new government is different from the prior one. During the month of the appointment of a new government, the market does not react to the coloration of the government, but only to the end of the uncertainty.
Several studies have been undertaken in order to assess whether US presidents of either the Republican or Democratic parties are better for the stock 3 Four times if we exclude the exceptional result of the fall of May 1981 (election of socialist president, François Mitterrand). market (Riley and Luksetich 1980; Huang 1985; Siegel 1994; Hensel and Ziemba 1995; Johnson et al. 1999) . 4 Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) provide a strong contribution to this debate. After an extensive battery of tests, they conclude that the higher performance under Democrat presidents is a puzzle; however, Powell et al. (2007) have demonstrated heavy statistical bias present in the work. Once the methodology is corrected, and extending the sample back to 1856, the difference in stock market returns becomes insignificant. Sy and Al Zaman (2011) explain the premium for Democrats in the US using a conditional version of the Fama French (1993) model that allows risk to vary across political cycles. For the German market, between 1960 , Döpke and Pierdzioch (2006 are unable to confirm the findings of a higher performance under Left governments. Bialkowski et al. (2006) provide a similar conclusion, studying 24 countries between 1980 and 2005. This paper covers the entire period of democratic national elections in France (1871-2008 or 1,654 months). 5 From the beginning of the period studied, economic ideology sharply distinguishes the Left and the Right in France.
Whereas, in the case of the US, according to Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) , ideologies of the Democratic and Republican parties were not clearly delineated before WWI; as a consequence, they only study the period 1927-1998, or 852 months. More interestingly, the study carried out here covers 150 French government changes, against only 18 in the US for Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and no more than 36 for Powell et al. (2007) . This is due to the often unstable French parliamentary regime, whereas the US exhibits a relatively stable presidential regime. This paper escapes the statistical bias identified by Powell et al. (2007) via the use of alternative statistical tools (bootstrap procedure). The last, but maybe the main, factor that supports the virtues of a French study is that, over the period studied, France experiments with several coalition governments (which have included the communist party) that were openly hostile to the stock market.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the financial and political data. Section 3 explains the main findings, a test for an explanation by 5 chance and the stability of the difference over time. Section 4 controls for the risk and the macro-economic context. Section 5 demonstrates that accepting the hypothesis of a market able to anticipate political changes three months before they occur, the higher performance of the stock market under governments of the Left disappears. Section 6 concludes.
Data

Political data
All governments are binary ranked as Left or Right. 6 The criterion used is the coloration of the chief of government (Vice-Présidents du Conseil 7 , Présidents du Conseil 8 and Premiers Ministres 9 ), see Appendix 3. Between 1871 and 2008, France experiments with 157 governments headed by 142 different men (including one woman). Among these governments, seven exhibit duration of less than one month, and are, therefore, excluded from this study since the data on stock returns are only available at a monthly frequency. We have to note that one change of government is not always a consequence of an election but, in most cases, is the result of a parliament vote changing the coloration of the chief of government. Over the one hundred and fifty remaining governments, the average Other financial data are used, such as long-term interest rates on state bonds, which also come from Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010) . Short-term rates are the discount rate of the Banque de France (from NBER) available on monthly data except during 1914-1925 and 1940-1951 periods (in 1981. 11 In other words, the stock market exhibits a highly positive reaction in case of the appointment of a new government with a stock return three times higher than during the rest of the time (and even four times without May 1981, see Table 1 ). This result is based on a high number of observations (150). A second test using a bootstrap methodology is also run to test the probability that the difference is due to random chance. 150 months are randomly selected. 12
Then, the average of these 150 random months is calculated. The average of the 1,504 non-selected months is also calculated before this, to measure the difference. This manipulation is repeated 10,000 times. To obtain the probability that chance alone is driving the result, the number of cases with a difference, that is either higher or equal to the difference that has actually been observed, is divided by 10,000.
The higher price return observed in the case where a new government has formed only has a 6.39% probability of being due to chance. This possibility then falls to only 1.87% if May 1981 is excluded (Panel B in Table 1) , i.e., there is only a 1.87% probability that the higher return of 0.87% (87 basis points) observed during the 150 months of a new government is due to chance. In other words, by choosing 150 months randomly 10,000 times, only 1.87% of cases will exhibit a difference in average returns (compared to the 1,504 other months) equal or higher to the 87 basis points actually observed. This bootstrap test is very robust since it is free of any assumptions regarding the nature of the distribution of returns.
This higher return, independent of the coloration of the new government, is consistent with the idea that the appointment of a new government concludes a period of uncertainty, which reduces the risk for investors (Brown et al. 1988 ).
Our findings confirm Pantzalis et al. (2000) . They identified a positive stock market reaction during the period of election in 33 countries between 1974 and 1995.
10 Only a weak difference appears in the case of the appointment of the Right The sum of these two parts constitutes the total return: 9.80% under the Left versus 5.65% under the Right (see Table 2 ).
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The real return is probably more relevant for the stockholder. Therefore, the difference in real terms is computed. The inflation rate is slightly higher under Another relevant measure is the excess return. It is measured as the nominal total return minus the return of an asset which is hypothetically free of risk. The proxy for this risk-free asset is the short-term interest rate. The excess return is the compensation in terms of return provided as a counterpart to support the risk invested in stocks. This excess return avoids the problem of using inflation rates data which can contain large measurement errors when the inflation in question is higher than 50 % (such as between 1946 and 1948); especially when they are used to calculate monthly real returns using annual data only.
Similar to our results with the real return, the excess return is clearly larger under Left governments: 5.48% versus only 1.18% (see Table 2 ). The difference in excess returns is 4.3%. In the US, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) found a difference of 9% in favor of the Democrats, but with a global average excess return that was higher in the US than in France.
A last important effect could be that caused by taxation. However, the impact of taxation is very difficult to take into account: rates and bases vary over time, the tax is often different for dividend or capital gains, and worse still, the tax rates depend on the individual situation. As a result most of financial studies neglect the fiscal impact. But, a correct measure of the tax effect would not change our result, since the return under Right governments is close to zero.
Indeed, accepting the hypothesis that the tax level is higher under Left governments, it is better for an investor to pay a higher tax on a positive return than to pay a lower tax on a null return. Furthermore, the real tax level depends on the inflation rate. Indeed, the tax level is applied on the nominal return and then is paid even if the real return is negative. Since the inflation rate is higher under
Right governments, this bias should also be higher under the Right. The second control is another kind of bootstrap procedure, undertaken to measure the probability that chance explains the observed difference. Indeed, a difference, even significant according to a t-test, can be only the result of chance.
For each of the performance series observed, 10,000 re-samples are taken. The 1,654 monthly observations are randomly attributed to Right or Left. Then, the difference of means is calculated for the 10,000 artificial combinations. The sum of random cases that exhibit a difference equal to, or higher than, the difference actually observed, is divided by 10,000 to calculate the probability that chance is the true explanation.
Contrasting with the prior bootstrap test (see 3.1), the re-sampling is performed while maintaining two main characteristics: the length of the government's tenure and the return series. First, we keep the length of the government's tenure unchanged: the number of political changes and the length of each government should remain constant. Secondly, since we will test cumulative performances and not only monthly variations, we need to respect the integrity of the series (i.e. no random re-sampling). Indeed, returns series could be characterized by some properties which could be broken down if monthly returns are randomly re-sampled.
To maintain these two characteristics, one series of returns is shifted by one month for each resample, whereas the series of government duration remains constant. As an example, for the first re-sampling, the return assigned to January 13 1871 is that observed in February 1871; therefore, all the series is shifted. The return assigned to December 2008 (last month of the study) is that of January 1871. The second re-sampling assigned to January 1871, the return observed in March 1871 and so on. 10,000 re-samplings are performed. Therefore, the series of 1,654 monthly returns observed "turn" several times since "only" 1,654 resampling series can be created in respect of the two conditions mentioned above. 15 The probability that chance drives the actual difference is mentioned regardless of the direction of the difference. The number of cases divided by 10,000 are those of one random difference above the actually observed one whatever the direction. A more restrictive statistic would be derived by the measurement only of cases where the "random Left" out-performs the "random Right". These cases are half as likely that the probabilities presented here, since we retain all cases of difference higher than the one observed (and not only the cases in favor of a random Left). This choice is motivated by the desire to simplify the presentation of the results. Indeed, in the case of one very weak difference that chance can easily be the explanation (see Table 6 1903 1905 1908 1911 1913 1916 1919 1921 1924 1927 1929 1932 1935 1937 1940 1943 1945 1948 1951 1953 1956 1959 1961 1964 1967 1969 1972 1975 1977 1980 1983 1985 1988 1991 1993 1996 1999 2001 2004 2007 Strategy 1 
This higher return is not explained by higher risk
In Finance, risk is the common counterpart of returns. It is consistent to observe a higher return if the risk is also higher. The risk is commonly measured by the standard deviation of the returns. This potential explanation for the higher returns observed under Left governments can be rejected since the risk is higher under the Right. According to the F-test, the difference in risk is statistically significant (see Table 2 ) for all the measures of performance. In other words, the stock return is lower under the Right, whereas the risk supported by investors is higher. This higher risk leads to a stronger difference between Left and Right if we measure the compensation for the risk investors were exposed to and not only the observed returns.
The Sharpe ratio combines the returns and risk, giving a measure of the compensation for each unit of risk (see Appendix 1). As for the excess return, the observed total nominal return is minus by the short-term rate to provide the returns solely of the supported risk. Then, this return is divided by the supported risk which is measured by the standard deviation of the total nominal returns. In this way, the poor performance under governments of the Right appears worse:
the Sharpe ratio is 0.33 under Left and only 0.06 under the Right. As a consequence, the risk supported by stock-holders is, therefore, very poorly compensated under the Right.
The macroeconomic context partially explains the higher returns observed under the Left-wing governments
This higher return under the Left governments could simply be the result of a more favorable economic context. The coloration of the government could only be a "proxy" for overall economic activity. The stock returns are affected by changes in economic activity (Fama 1989; Campbell et al. 1997 ). If the coloration is correlated with the political business cycle, the correlation with stock market return can only be indirect (i.e. a proxy).
Different macroeconomic variables (available on a monthly basis) are known to partially predict stock prices: the dividend rate, the long-term interest rate, the inflation rate, the spread of terms on the rates (difference between longterm rate and short-term rate) and the relative short-term rate (the difference between the short-term rate and its moving average over the last twelve months).
Cross-correlations exhibit a strong correlation between long-term rates and the term spread. Thus, the long-term rate is excluded because all information must be contained in the spread of terms variable.
Conversely, despite their strong correlation with the spread of terms and with inflation (negative correlation), the ratio D / P is maintained as it should contain different information. As a consequence, five variables are retained to control for the macroeconomic situation. Moreover, the goal of the following regression is to control for these variables, and not to identify explanatory variables (and, therefore, to seek significant results). For the same reason, the stationarity of variables is not relevant to the analysis; the regression can be fallacious because we do not look for significance in relationships. The five macroeconomic variables used allow the stock returns to be decomposed into expected and unexpected parts. With a regression of macroeconomic variables on monthly returns (excess returns measured in logarithm) according to equation (1), we assume the expected return ( ) to be the part of the return that is due to the macroeconomic context. The residual of the regression ( is assigned to be the unexpected part.
(1)
Each month, the expected and unexpected parts are measured, and, then, attributed to either Left or Right governments according to whether the Left or the Right is in office during that month. However, the results of this analysis can, arguably, be criticized. In part, this is because the expected returns are only poorly captured by the macro-economic variables, with an R² of less than 0.1 (typical in this kind of exercise 91 -0.19 16.51 18.25 -1.75 16.51 18.42 -1.91 F-test (p-value) 0
Excess return Expected
Unexpected
Observed returns are regressed via the forecasting variables: the fitted values of the regression are the expected returns (I) and the regression residuals are unexpected returns (II) attributed each month and to either the Left or the Right.
Can the market anticipations explain the over-performance under the Left?
Shocks before political coloration changes
Market reaction during the months preceding the coloration change is more consistent with common opinion. During the three months preceding the appointment of a Left government, stock prices fall by 7.44% (non-annualized) on average (Table 5) . 18 Conversely, when Right governments are set to replace the Left, the stock prices increase by 9.63% on average. This huge difference of 17.08% (1,708 basis points) of price variations (capital gains) is also observed on real returns and excess returns (1,567 and 1,683 basis points). In all cases, the difference is statistically robust. In addition, chance (line bootstrap test) has a very low probability of being the source of these differences.
It is important to note that this high return observed under the Left governments, just before the coloration change, is not inconsistent with the finding (presented in 3.1) that the market appreciates with all appointments. 18 According to a non-reported test, a length of three months provides the higher difference.
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Indeed, with the increase during the month of the appointment of any new government, stock prices react to the end of the uncertainty that characterized the period preceding the fall of any government (as is predicted by the uncertain information theory of Brown et al. 1988) . While here, the market gives one price, three months before the appointment, to a more or less business-friendly future government.
The huge difference in returns, observed during the three months prior to a coloration change, is consistent with the idea that a Right-wing government is more business friendly. The analytical strength of this difference implies that the market correctly forecasts the coloration of a future government. To summarize, a large discrepancy is observed over the three prior months ( This finding is consistent with the theory of an efficient market that fully integrates all the available information, including the political equilibrium (Fama 1991) . Indeed, it is reasonable to accept the idea that the market integrates the information of a political coloration change, since the change appears predictable.
Political coloration changes are rarely unpredictable exogenous shocks.
Consequently, financial market participants are partially able to integrate the news before the actual implementation. Certainly, the remaining, small, premium for the Left (which can easily be explained by chance) would completely disappear after controlling for macroeconomic conditions. In contrast, the market "votes" three months before the results of an election. It appears that, at least, the Right does not generate better stock performance: it is unrealistic to expect greater economic success from a government that is considered to be more business-friendly.
